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Monday, November 21, 2011

Department of Agriculture

Department of Agriculture

 

The Department of Agriculture provides an array of subsidy programs for farmers and imposes extensive regulations on agricultural markets. It operates food assistance programs, such as the food stamp and school lunch programs, and it administers many subsidy programs for rural parts of the nation. The Forest Service also forms part of the Department of Agriculture.

The department will spend $152 billion in 2011, or more than $1,200 for every U.S. household. It operates about 235 subsidy programs and employs 98,000 workers in about 7,000 offices across the country.


Timeline of Government Growth

  • See this timeline for key events in the department's growth.

Reading Room

Cato Experts

Spending Cuts Summary

Downsize This!

  • Agricultural Subsidies. The department provides up to $30 billion annually to farmers of corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, wheat, and other crops. It also aids farmers with research, loan, and insurance programs.
  • Agricultural Regulations and Trade Barriers. The government regulates domestic markets for products such as sugar and milk, and it imposes trade restrictions on various farm products.
  • Rural Subsidies. The department operates a range of subsidy programs for businesses and individuals living in rural areas.
  • Food Subsidies. Most of the department's budget goes toward food subsidies, including the food stamp and school lunch programs.
  • Forest Service. The Forest Service oversees 193 million acres of forests and provides subsidies to businesses and state governments.

"Cato is on the right track with its proposals to downsize the USDA. Many of the department's programs originated in the Great Depression and are completely out of date and no longer needed, if they ever were. Downsizing the USDA would help move American agriculture into the 21st century."

- John R. Norton, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, 1985-1986


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Can the Underground Economy Save Europe?

Can the Underground Economy Save Europe?

Mises Daily: Monday, November 21, 2011 by

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"The growth of unofficial employment is an entrepreneurial response to unnecessarily rigid labor markets and excess regulation."

As the old saying goes, the more expensive you are to fire, the more expensive you are to hire. Nowhere is this more apparent than on the European continent.

Even with the United States' lengthening of unemployment insurance benefits at the wake of this crisis, the benefits for the standard down-on-his-luck American pale in comparison to those of the average European. Upon job separation the average Frenchman can expect to see more than half of his salary extended in the form of unemployment benefits. Many European workers see these benefits extended for two to three years after their termination, with some countries extending benefits indefinitely.

Spells of unemployment are consequently prolonged on the European continent. Strict laws governing the separation of employees from companies (a nice way to say, "You're fired") lower the rate of job separation in these countries. Unfortunately, these laws also decrease the rate of job finding, resulting in the prolonged unemployment durations evident.

This problem of unemployed masses was no more than an unfortunate consequence of a well-developed social-welfare system during the boom years. Government coffers were plush to pay out hefty benefits. As the crisis wears on, this unfortunate side effect is increasingly turning into an oncoming train wreck as government deficits widen and welfare payments strain already tenuous state finances.

Decreasing benefits may be unfortunate to those relying on them, but such cuts are inevitable. Already some countries have enacted measures to try to bring these unsustainable systems closer to sustainability. The retirement age has been extended to reduce social-security payments, and unemployment benefits have been cut. People have responded with protests, trying to maintain the standard of living that they fought so hard to achieve over the past decades. Unfortunately, not all things desirable are feasible — Europe's plush welfare system is a case in point.

Fortunately there is a silver lining. In most European countries, and especially in the crisis-stricken periphery, large underground economies exist. While Spain's official unemployment rate is pegged around 20 percent, a substantial portion of its workers are indeed employed, if only outside official statistics. As I outline in a new collection I've edited, Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession, the underground economies of Europe's periphery provide ample (if not always desirable) opportunities for employment. While the Greek economy has the largest underground estimated at 25.2 percent of GDP, the PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) average 21.7 percent of their economic activity hidden from the official statistics. For comparison, 14.7 percent of German, and 7.8 percent of American output is estimated to be confined to the underground.

If substantial masses of officially unemployed workers can take solace in knowing that there exist large underground venues for their efforts, we may do well to outline the reasons why this unofficial option exists. Hans Sennholz, in his work The Underground Economy, lists four main categories of underground economy activity:

  1. that portion evading taxes,
  2. that portion violating laws or production standards,
  3. production from transfer beneficiaries barred from otherwise partaking in pecuniary-enhancing activities (welfare recipients for example), and
  4. production from illegal aliens.

While many people assume that the underground economy consists purely of tax evaders and drug dealers, we see that only two of the categories above allow for these groups. That is not to say that underground workers in the other categories do not evade taxes or sell elicit substances. It is to say that the main reason for their involvement outside of the official economy is neither of those reasons.

Europe's underground economies have seen much growth over the past 30 years, especially since this crisis began. In some ways the growth of unofficial employment is an entrepreneurial response to unnecessarily rigid labor markets and excess regulation. Evidence suggests that industry in at least two of our prime culprits have benefited from the expansion of the underground economy. Growing underground economy employment has allowed Italian and Spanish firms to expand and contract production more easily to market demands.

There is an increased emphasis on reallocating the underground economy into the official one as Europe's crisis progresses. The most commonly advocated method involves more frequent tax audits and heavier fines to incentivize entrepreneurs to report their full incomes to the official authorities. The problem with such a solution is that it ignores the core reason why the underground economy exists — and may very well strengthen its existence.

Entrepreneurs operate in the unofficial economy for two main reasons: taxes make official transactions unprofitable, or regulations make them unfeasible. Threats of increased monetary fines do nothing to alleviate the former reason, while only a reduction in the web of rules and regulations will reduce the latter.

Increased fines and audits will undoubtedly reduce the size of the underground economy. Entrepreneurs, even underground ones, will respond to the increased costs and risks by reducing the scope of their activities. This reduction will not translate into an increase in official market activity. Only by easing the regulatory and tax burden facing entrepreneurs will more of them be willing to operate in the official economy.

Instead of viewing Europe's underground economies as bad things, policy makers would do well to start viewing them for what they are: an important signal that old interventionist policies have failed. If one views large underground economies as inherently bad, one must also deem the policies that breed their existence to be bad.

 

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

lawyerschile: The Goldman Rule: Don't Let This Puppet Master Pull Your Strings

The Goldman Rule: Don't Let This Puppet Master Pull Your Strings

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein was really on a roll speaking at an investment conference in New York last week.

Among other things, he said there's no way we can conclude that a slowdown in banking and trading businesses is "secular, rather than cyclical."

That alone was enough to make me laugh. But then he went on to address concerns about pending regulations that are coming as a result of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act.

"In our conversations with clients, they have expressed several concerns on the impact to their businesses," Blankfein said, making it clear that his firm will make client interests a theme of its arguments against the regulations. "What Goldman Sachs does for our clients is even more relevant and important."

Now that should make you laugh - if, of course, you're not too afraid.

The truth is that Goldman Sachs and the rest of the big banks on Wall Street - in the inimitable words of author Michael Lewis from his seminal book Liar's Poker - invariably "blow up" customers to make money for themselves.

Not only do they run roughshod over their customers (trading partners) and clients (banking relationships), the big banks manipulate markets, industries, economies and countries to fatten their already gigantic bonus pools and personal fortunes.

Now, I'm not singling out Goldman Sachs because it's the biggest and baddest bully on the block, which it is. I'm not blasting Goldman because I once idolized the firm - its culture, its talent, its sheer money-making prowess - and have seen its vision blinded by greed since going public in 1999. I'm not saying Goldman is the only self-serving, greedy, and pretentious firm on Wall Street. And, I'm certainly not calling out Lloyd Blankfein, whose extraordinary accomplishments as a trader are legendary, but whose leadership of Goldman has been marred by what might generously be described as "PR gaffes."

What I am doing is using Goldman as proof positive that Wall Street banks are bad news.

In fact, rather than seeing them rebound we would all be better off seeing them unwound.

From Wall Street to K Street - And Back

Let me start with the nexus of power and money in this country. That nexus resides exactly where Wall Street and Washington intersect. Each serves the other and the middle-class be damned.

You see, the "revolving door" metaphor that's so often used to describe the relationship between Wall Street and Washington isn't exactly accurate.

The reality is that there is no revolving door. There are no doors at all. It is more like one giant corridor where all the water cooler talk is about paying for campaigns, paying lobbyists, and paying bonuses.

There's a reason why Goldman Sachs is derisively referred to as "Government Sachs." The flow of executives and operatives between Goldman and Washington, and even other world governments and central banks for that matter, is legendary.

I can't point out all the connections - there are simply too many. But I will point out a few that you may not be aware of.

How about Robert Rubin - the former Goldman co-CEO who became Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration? From that post, Rubin squashed all regulations pertaining to derivatives, and ended Depression-era laws like the Glass-Steagall Act (which separated commercial banks from investment banks) so giant Citicorp could be formed by the merger of Travelers and Citibank. Rubin then went to Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), where he made some $119 million while leveraging the bank up with derivatives before it had to be bailed out.

Bailed out by whom? Bailed out by then Treasury Secretary Henry M. "Hank" Paulson, himself a former Goldman CEO.

And bailed out how? With the help of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, whose chairman was Steve Friedman, a former Goldman partner, still on Goldman's board.

That's the same Steve Friedman who bought $3 million worth of Goldman shares based on allegedly inside information he garnered at the Fed and from Goldman's board meetings, profited handsomely, and had to resign from the Fed board -- but not give any of his profits back.

And finally, Goldman itself had to be bailed out when it ran to the Fed on a Sunday in September 2008 to beg to be turned from an investment bank to a bank holding company so it could get Fed cash.

The Usual Suspects

There are innumerable connections and fascinating stories. So, I won't bore you with the one about Goldman arranging a currency swap at an apparently "fictitious" exchange rate for the government of Greece. Nor how that swap facilitated Greece hiding its debts to get into the Eurozone, so it could then borrow euros ad nauseam until it had to be bailed out - again and again.

I'm not going there. Because if I did I'd have to get into how precariously positioned the new "technocrats" -- who are supposed to save Italy with the help of the ECB -- actually are.

And who are they?

Well, there's Mario Draghi, the new president of the ECB. Super Mario, it turns out, was Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs International, and a member of the firm-wide management committee from 2002 to 2005. He claims to have not been responsible for the Greek currency swap, saying it was arranged before he went to Goldman. But he's never denied it.

That's comforting.

If he runs the ECB the same way Goldman runs its business, there might be some areas where transparency may not be the order of the day. And isn't that exactly what a central bank is supposed to be about?

If I had more time here I'd mention that Mario Monti, prime minister-designate of Italy, not only was a European Commissioner, but an international adviser to Goldman Sachs.

I'm just comforted to know that these old buddies are all still manipulating global finances for the betterment of our interests and the Goldman bonus pool this fiscal year or next.

Customer Service

I'm also not going to get into how Goldman set American International Group Inc. (NYSE: AIG) up to fail, or how the New York Fed made the firm whole on the credit default swaps it had written on AIG. Nor will I get into how Goldman board member Rajat Gupta allegedly passed along boardroom secrets to his friend and Goldman customer Raj Rajaratnam (now serving time for insider trading), or how the Justice Department is looking into how Goldman teed-up millions of investors and hit a hole in one when the mortgage market failed and they were short.

I'm only going to point to one small incident that proves Goldman really does have the interest of its clients at heart.

Back in 2007 Goldman constructed a little billion-dollar deal for a customer named John Paulson. Only the firm didn't tell its other customers, the ones to which it sold the Paulson deal known as Abacus 2007-AC1, that the deal was designed to fail.

Paulson made out like a bandit because he bet against the deal. Now that's good customer service.

Goldman didn't admit any wrongdoing and paid a paltry $550 million fine, which in terms of its 2009 earnings amounted to 15 days worth of register ringing.

So, let me get this right: Goldman, and the rest of its big bank brethren, are all about their customers. And they want their customers to go to bat for them with the regulators.

I suppose it was those nasty regulators that caused the whole credit crisis and the Great Recession in the first place.

And I guess that means that if Goldman, with the help of its customers, can get all those pesky regulators out of the way, we'd all finally be free to do business and live happily ever after - especially Goldman and the rest of big banks, of course.


 

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile