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Thursday, August 09, 2012

Waldron's Rule of Law

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Waldron's Rule of Law

Mises Daily:Thursday, August 09, 2012 by

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[The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property • By Jeremy Waldron • Cambridge University Press, 2012 • xiv + 118 pages]

The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property

Classical liberals like Friedrich Hayek and Richard Epstein have often claimed that the rule of law imposes strong constraints on the state's regulation of private property. If they are right, this would be a very effective argument against such regulation, as the rule of law is an ideal commanding wide respect, by no means confined to those of classical-liberal or libertarian inclinations.

Governments that arbitrarily deny legal process to groups of people or punish people for violating orders undisclosed to them obviously violate the rule of law; but how can formal requirements of proper law such as generality and nondiscrimination limit the power of the state to regulate property? The classical liberals answer that people should be able to use law to guide their behavior; interferences with private property disrupt their reasonable expectations of how they can use their property and unduly depend for their implementation on administrative discretion.

Jeremy Waldron, a distinguished legal philosopher, disagrees with this line of thought; and in this short book he deploys many arguments against it and against Lockean accounts of property rights as well.[1] I don't find what he says persuasive, but his thoughtful discussion merits the attention of everyone interested in libertarian political philosophy.

Waldron has devoted a great deal of his life as a scholar to Locke's theory of property, but his study has not led him to accept it. In this theory, people acquire property by homesteading it; once acquired, property may be transferred by exchange, gift, or bequest to others. A common objection holds that this account can have little or no application to the world we live in today. People cannot trace their property back to an original act of just appropriation, passed to them through transfers wholly legitimate.[2]

Waldron advances a variant of this argument. Not only cannot we trace back property titles in the way the theory needs, but we know that property titles often stem from government grants. He is a New Zealander, and he cites as an example the situation in his native country. "But mostly the land seems to have been governed by social and public legal arrangements from start to finish. It was used and cultivated first by a collective group, its original Maori owners" (p. 29). It then passed by treaty to the British government who in turn transferred it to settlers.

The transition from indigenous tribal property to government property to leasehold property on the government's terms to individual freehold is something that was supervised by the state purportedly in the public interest at every stage. (p. 30)

What better evidence could we have that the Lockean theory cannot be used by present owners of property in New Zealand to resist government regulations as encroachments on their rights?

This argument does not succeed; it begs the question against Locke's theory. So long as the original acts of appropriation by the Maori passed the Lockean tests, which Waldron does not challenge, the process Waldron describes at no point violates Locke's theory. It is not a part of that theory that the state cannot be one of the links in the chain of transmission of property, though indeed there are excellent arguments against the justification for a state altogether. The state can, if it acquires property, then sell it to people under various conditions, but its doing so does not subject the new owners to further unspecified regulations of their property by the state. To think otherwise, as Waldron does, is to assume precisely what is at issue in the controversy. His account of New Zealand property leaves Locke unscathed.

Waldron has another argument against the Lockean view, and here he addresses directly the concerns about expectations used by Hayek, Epstein, and others who use the rule of law to fence in the government's interference with property rights. Do Lockean rights, he surprisingly asks, increase stability of expectations? He claims that they do not:

The [Lockean] picture we are being sold has property rights being determined pre-politically; these are the ones that are to respected by the legislature under this substantive constraint. (p. 38)

But the Lockean theory is controversial. Even among people who accept the basic outlines of it, disagreements over such matters as the exact nature of the principle of appropriation abound. "By insisting therefore that positive law is subject to this substantive constraint rooted in the moral reality of pre-political property rights, Locke is subjecting the legislature to a discipline of uncertainty" (p. 39).

This conclusion does not at all follow. A Lockean framework leaves many questions of detail unsettled, true enough; but then people must simply choose what to do within this framework and stick to it, in order to arrive at a stable system of property. Why must a correct theory of property resolve in advance all questions, leaving nothing to be decided by convention? Further, even if details of the theory do admit of correct answers, the fact that people disagree on these need not introduce instability. Those who think the arrangements in place objectively mistaken on these details may nevertheless think it more important to maintain stability than to insist that matters be changed entirely to their liking.

Although Waldron does not discuss this solution, he does address a proposal advanced by James Tully, which he acknowledges would settle the difficulty over stability. (He thinks, though, that it is a misinterpretation of Locke.) On this view, the legislature sets property rights as it wishes: it is these legislatively determined rights that are then stably established.

On Tully's account, the property rights that are protected are themselves artifacts of public law. As such, they are clear, well known, and stable; and they are no longer at the mercy of natural law controversies. But the price of that deliverance is that the property rights in question, being the offspring of legislation, can have very little power and status to set up against legislation (of the environmental kind). Property is no longer privileged as a special or primeval form of law. (p. 41)

Once more the conclusion does not follow. So long as stability is taken to be of great importance, Locke's theory on this interpretation does not allow the legislature to change property arrangements in accord with its wishes of the moment. Waldron, anxious to pursue his environmental imperative, has forgotten the elementary point that laws can be entrenched in a legal system without reference to natural-law constraints.

Before turning from Waldron's discussion of the Lockean theory, I must protest against what can only be called a gross misstatement. Concerning Robert Nozick, one of the foremost 20th-century defenders of the theory, he says,

he was never prepared to say that a Lockean theory legitimized contemporary disparities of wealth in the United States. On the contrary, he thought it undeniable that contemporary holdings in America would be condemned as unjust by any remotely plausible conception of historical entitlement. (p. 33)

To this statement, he appends a reference to pages 230–231 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. It is quite true that Nozick in those pages says that schemes of transfer payments cannot be condemned as unjust by his theory, in the absence of information of what the principle of rectification requires. There is nothing whatever there, though, condemning contemporary American disparities of wealth. Waldron has unaccountably attributed his own egalitarian proclivities to Nozick.

As mentioned earlier, Waldron advances a great many arguments to challenge the connection of the rule of law with restrictions on the legislative regulation of property, but I shall discuss only one more. Waldron has an interesting view of the famous Lucas case, in which a businessman purchased beachfront property in South Carolina, intending to build houses on the land for commercial sale. A law passed after the sale by the South Carolina legislature prevented him from doing so, and he suffered a large loss as a result. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled that he had been the victim of an unlawful "taking" of his property and required that he be granted compensation for his losses.

Waldron finds fault with the verdict. Given the many environmental regulations already enacted by the legislature, should not Lucas have anticipated that he might not have been able to use the property as he wished? How then can one rightly assert, appealing to the rule of law, that he had the right not to have overturned his reasonable expectations of how he might use the property commercially? He ought not to have assumed without warrant that he could do with the property what the legislature later determined he could not.

True, Mr. Lucas bought his property in 1986, a year or three before the new legislation came into force. But he was not a neophyte in these matters.… Mr. Lucas was not exactly sand-bagged by the council's eventual intervention to safeguard the eroding beaches on and in the immediate vicinity of his property. (pp. 79–80)

In sum, Waldron thinks if someone has reason to think that the government may take from him the right to use his property for commercial use, then his reasonable expectations for use of the property have not been upset. He ought not to have formed these expectations in the first place. By analogy, someone's expectations of personal security have not been upset if he knows that he may in future be compelled to play Russian roulette. Somehow, this does not seem a satisfactory result.

Notes

[1] I have recently reviewed another book by this prolific scholar, The Harm in Hate Speech.

[2] See the discussion of this objection in Murray Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, chapter 10, "The Problem of Land Theft," especially the discussion on pp. 67ff.

Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Wednesday, August 08, 2012

Mises Daily Anarchy in the Aachen

Anarchy in the Aachen

Mises Daily:Wednesday, August 08, 2012 by

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Can a community without a central government avoid descending into chaos and rampant criminality? Can its economy grow and thrive without the intervening regulatory hand of the state? Can its disputes be settled without a monopoly on legal judgments? If the strange and little-known case of the condominum of Moresnet — a wedge of disputed territory in northwestern Europe, and arguably Europe's counterpart to America's so-called Wild West — acts as our guide, we must conclude that statelessness is not only possible but beneficial to progress, carrying profound advantages over coercive bureaucracies.

The remarkable experiment that was Moresenet was an indirect consequence of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), which, like all wars, empowered the governments of participating states at the expense of their populations: nationalism grew more fervent; many nations suspended specie payments indefinitely; and a new crop of destitute amputees appeared in streets all across Europe.

In the Congress of Vienna, which concluded the war, borders were redrawn according to the "balance-of-power" theory: no state should be in a position to dominate others militarily. There were some disagreements, one in particular between Prussia and the Netherlands regarding the miniscule, mineral-rich map spot known as the "old mountain" — Altenberg in German, Vieille Montagne in French — which held a large zinc mine that profitably extricated tons of ore from the ground. With a major war recently concluded, and the next nearest zinc source of any significance in England, it behooved the two powers to jointly control the operation.

They settled on an accommodation; the mountain mine would be a region of shared sovereignty. So from its inception in 1816, the zone would fall under the aegis of several states: Prussia and the Netherlands initially, and Belgium taking the place of the Netherlands after gaining its independence in 1830. Designated "Neutral Moresnet," the small land occupied a triangular spot between these three states, its area largely covered by the quarry, some company buildings, a bank, schools, several stores, a hospital, and the roughly 50 cottages housing 256 miners and support personnel.[1]

The territory "originate[ed] in mistake … perpetuated by [the] jealousy [and] inability of … two governments to concur in partition," and initially, little changed within the district.[2] But over the next few decades, Moresnet's small size and ambiguous oversight by several national powers came together to create an inadvertent experiment deep in the Aachen forests of northwestern Europe.

The first factor is that, although nominally monitored by several nations, by virtue of its small size, Moresnet was loosely supervised at best. Not only was it so small that a crumb would blot out its existence on most maps; neither was there much reason for its overseers to direct attention to it: it sat quietly, reliably excavating 8,500 tons of zinc each year. Occasionally a patrolling Prussian, Dutch, or Belgian soldier would wander close to the border — as a demilitarized zone, Moresnet territory was explicitly off limits for military forces — but for the most part the mining community was left alone.

And it wasn't just administrators who lost track of the of the anomalous territory; it was secluded enough that one traveler recalled inquiring

at [a nearby] hotel, at some neighboring shops, and at both of the railway stations … [but still couldn't be told] how to reach Neutral Moresnet; they had no idea at all, or guessed at random at various impossible stations.[3]

Within the triangle, there was a minimal government in the form of a burgomaster, assisted by a "Committee of Ten." Despite its somewhat ominous name, the committee "wield[ed] no real power" and the burgomaster was "far from being a … despot."[4]

Moresnet also employed a police force of one, referred to with local good humor — and perhaps mocking nearby Prussia with its General Staff and large social class of military officers — as Moresnet's "Secretary of War."[5] The lone police officer was usually "to be seen in full uniform enjoying a game of chess or billiards with the burgomaster at the beer garden on the shores of the lake."[6]

Through the rest of the 19th century, Moresnet's course ran distinct from that of surrounding European states. In 1848, for example, violent revolutions broke out in Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Switzerland, Poland, Ireland, Wallachia, the Ukraine, and throughout the Habsburg Empire. For Moresnettians, life in 1848 proceeded unperturbed, and the year was noteworthy only for the first minting of sovereign coins, which local merchants accepted for use alongside other currencies.[7]

Despite its isolation, word slowly spread that within Moresnet — if one could find it — "imports from surrounding countries were toll free, the taxes were very low, prices were lower and wages higher than in [other European] countries."[8]

Over the following decades the population of the tiny region grew correspondingly: by 1850, the population had doubled, and in addition to the zinc mine, new businesses and even some small farms began to spring up.

Alongside the negligible tax burden, a unique legal climate favored the expansion of economic activity within the tiny district. On inception, the Congress of Vienna, which created Neutral Moresnet, held that its laws would be construed in accordance with the Code Napoleon, known for

its stress on clearly written and accessible law, [which] was a major step in replacing the previous patchwork of feudal laws.… Laws could be applied only if they had been duly promulgated, and only if they had been published officially (including provisions for publishing delays, given the means of communication available at the time); thus no secret laws were authorized. It [also] prohibited ex post factor laws.[9]

And most importantly of all, the code placed a primary importance on "property rights … [which] were made absolute," naturally generating a favorable climate for commercial enterprise.[10] One periodical noted that a "thief tried … [nearby] gets … a few months, while the Code Napoleon specifies five years."[11]

This contrasted sharply with the Allgemeines Landrecht legal system of neighboring Prussia, which "used an incredibly casuistic and imprecise language, making it hard to properly understand and use in practice," but which for some legal purposes may have held advantages over the Code Napoleon.[12] Alternately, disputes could be directed to the burgomaster's "petty tribunal" for quick decisions on smaller issues and disputes.[13] His

head-quarters were … "under his hat." He went about town and held court wherever he happened to be when his service as justice was required, which, happily, was not often. When complaint was made to him, he would listen patiently and attentively … [then] whistle some favorite air, and thus take time to resolve the matter in his mind.… His judgments were always intelligible and fair, insomuch that they were never excepted to or appealed from during all his term of thirty-five years.[14]

Moresnet inhabitants, therefore, had access to several different systems for resolution of disputes — a rudimentary market for justice — and were therefore empowered to take their issues to the venue they felt afforded the best chances of satisfactory resolution.

Further, residents of Neutral Moresnet were not required to fulfill the compulsory military requirements of their nations of origin.[15] This no doubt motivated many of the new arrivals, in particular those from Prussia, which fought half a dozen wars during the 19th century.[16]

Dr. Wilhelm Molly  (1838-1919)

The population of the hamlet quadrupled between 1850 and 1860, topping 2,000 residents. One newcomer was particularly significant. Dr. Wilhelm Molly arrived in 1863 to become the general practitioner of the mining company, and soon won celebrity by thwarting a local cholera epidemic in Moresnet. Like many physicians of his era, Dr. Molly had numerous interests, some of which would play a role in Moresnet's development over the next half-century.[17]

From the beginning of the designation of Neutral Moresnet, it was known that the Vieille Montagne zinc mine could not, and would not, produce indefinitely. In 1885, the zinc mine finally wound down and ceased operation, but this wasn't especially worrisome economically: numerous businesses were now flourishing, including "60–70 bars and cafes [along] the main street," a number of breweries, small farms, and at least one dairy operation.[18] Taxes hadn't changed since the designation of the neutral zone in 1816, and visitors noted that Moresnet was "without the beggars who are [a] sadly familiar sight" across the rest of Europe.[19]

To Dr. Molly, the closing of the zinc mine hardly presented reason for the culmination of Neutral Moresnet as a community, much less its end. On the contrary, he became the foremost advocate of pursuing a path of complete independence and severing the few ties that Moresnet had with Prussia and Belgium. Within a year after the zinc mine closed down, he spearheaded the founding of a local, private postal service — but it was quickly shut down by Prussian and Belgian authorities.

Undeterred, he explored numerous other initiatives. In 1903, a group of entrepreneurs proposed developing a casino there to rival those in Monte Carlo, offering to build electric trolleys to nearby towns and "share the profit with every citizen."[20] In fact, a small casino opened briefly, but like the postal service was short-lived; on hearing of it, the king of Belgium threatened Moresnet's always-tenuous independence.

But Belgium proved the least of Moresnet's worries. In 1900 the Prussian state — now itself consolidated into the greater German Empire — began to undertake "aggressive" tactics towards pressuring the residents of the zone to consent to absorption.[21] None too subtle and true to its martial heritage, Prussian efforts included "outright sabotage," such as cutting off Moresnet's electricity and telephone connections at times.[22] When citizens attempted to run new electrical and telephone lines, Prussia attempted to thwart them, as well as "prevent[ing] the appointment of new … officials" known to support Moresnettian independence.[23]

But "these people, small though their territory, w[ould] not be cabined, cribbed, confined."[24] In fact, despite being harassed by a state thousands of times larger and armed to the teeth, by 1907 the population of the hamlet had increased to almost 3,800, only 460 of whom were descendents of the original Moresnettians.[25] The rest came from varied and far-flung locations: not only Germans, Belgians and Dutch, but also former residents of Italy, Switzerland, and Russia — and eventually two Americans and even one Chinese resident. A large cathedral had come to occupy the center of the community, which had expanded to over 800 homes.[26] Even though Belgian Aix-la-Chapelle was nearby and offered a more cosmopolitan experience, in general, the Moresnettians chose "not [to] leave the Triangle, but variedly find the spice of life within its slender borders."[27]

Dr. Molly — now living in the "thoroughly autonomous" Neutral Moresnet for half a century — began to view the independence and prosperity of Moresnet as a place compatible with the Weltanschauung of another of his intellectual pursuits: the universal language and culture of Esperanto.[28] While a detailed discussion of Esperanto is beyond the scope of this writing, the synthetic language was founded in 1887 by L.L. Zamenhof to eliminate the "hate and prejudice" that he theorized arose between ethnic groups owing to language differences and often leading to war; and it should come as little surprise that Esperanto's founder additionally expressed his

profound [conviction] that every nationalism offers humanity only the greatest unhappiness.… It is true that the nationalism of oppressed peoples — as a natural self-defensive reaction — is much more excusable than the nationalism of peoples who oppress; but, if the nationalism of the strong is ignoble, the nationalism of the weak is imprudent; both give birth to and support each other.[29]

Embracing this thinly veiled antistate philosophy and having corresponded for years with prominent Esperantists around the world, in 1906, Dr. Molly met with several colleagues to discuss designating Neutral Moresnet as a self-determining global haven for Esperantists; a territory that would "embrace aims and ideals affecting the brotherhood of man … civilized life … emancipating ourselves from all that is absurd and unworthy in convention, all that the ignorant centuries have imposed upon us."[30] Core to that initiative, he proposed that the name of the enclave be changed to Amikejo — Esperanto for "place of friendship" — not only espousing their explicitly peaceful nature, but undoubtedly a propagandist thumb in the eye of ever-marauding Prussia.[31]

Two years later, in 1908, a large celebration was held commemorating the launch of the renamed Amikejo, complete with festivities and the airing of a new national anthem.[32] Unsurprisingly, the occasion went unnoted (and Amikejo unrecognized) by nearby states, although numerous newspapers reported the event.

By 1914, Amikejo's population topped 4,600 people, peacefully cohabitating in an economically prosperous political limbo characterized by an "absence of definite rule."[33] Signs and notifications were printed in German, French, and Esperanto, and residents had developed one of the "queerest and most unintelligible dialects in the world."[34] Indeed, an American — an American of the turn of the century, no less — described the establishment as having "a sort of al fresco freedom of life, an untrammelledness which comes naturally from long-continued absence of centralized restraint."[35]

Indeed; for a century, residents and settlers in the diminutive wedge of land had found governments — internally and foreign — superfluous to and iniquitous toward the attainment of individual liberty. In one sense the Moresnet/Amikejo experiment might be viewed as Europe's analog to the American West, covering a greater length of time but on a much smaller scale. Summarizing, one reporter described it as

one of the smallest and strangest territories in the world … an encircling ridge of high mountains veritably buries it from neighboring civilization and culture and leaves it in a little world of its own.… [And] for nearly a century, the inhabitants have never experienced the feeling of being under the rule of an emperor, king or president. They are independent, governed by no one, at liberty to do as they please.[36]

More to the point, another visitor described Amikejo in simple terms: "a legal anarchy."[37]

Despite a vibrant, small-scale economy, the existence of the district remained enormously fragile in the tempestuous political environment of early 20th-century Continental Europe. Amikejans perennially worried over the "impermanency of their pleasing status," and this concern was realized in 1914 when war broke out between France and Germany.[38] Although Amikejo escaped destruction as invading German forces bypassed it — it was, fortuitously, "an oasis in a desert of destruction" — the War proved a ready excuse, confirming the suspicion that "Prussia … always had the intention to appropriate the territory" when Germany statutorily annexed the district in 1915.[39]

Two inconceivably bloody years later, with the end of the war in sight, only the Contemporary Review, a British journal of politics and social reform, considered the plight of Amikejo née Moresnet:

The fate of Moresnet has been forgotten in this immense catastrophe. We must bear it in mind. After the victory the plenipotentiaries who draw up the conditions of peace must not neglect this poor little piece of independence which has been victimized.[40]

The cost of the Great War was unimaginably staggering, dwarfing those of previous conflicts in virtually every category: 37 million casualties, the influenza pandemic, widespread hunger, civil dislocation, economic wreckage, and more. But another, seldom-considered consequence of the war — of all wars — was, and is, the uncountable heaps of unfulfilled promises and discarded goals left in the wake of the conflagration. And with article 32 of the Treaty of Versailles — "Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Belgium over the whole of the contested territory of Moresnet"[41] — these were joined by yet another: Dr. Molly's vision.

Comment on this article.

Peter C. Earle is the founder of FINAGEM, LLC. Follow him on Twitter. Send him mail. See Peter C. Earle's article archives.

Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Tuesday, August 07, 2012

Mises Daily The Apocalyptic Vision of The Road

Mises Daily 

Other Dailies
The First Execution for Religion on American Soil
by Murray N. Rothbard


The Statist Propositions of Protectionism 
by Gary North


Abundance vs. Scarcity 
by Frederic Bastiat




The Apocalyptic Vision of The Road
by Ben O'Neill on August 7, 2012

What is the "means of production" and what significance does it have to society? How is it created, expanded, or merely sustained? What is the relationship between the prevailing moral order of a society and its accumulation of capital?

These are questions that economists and political philosophers have considered throughout the history of economic thought. If you have ever enquired into the differences between capitalism and socialism you will have heard of the means of production, and you will be aware that this is very important to the organization of society. You might have heard of this, but you might not have spent much thought on the relationship between capital and moral order. Indeed, why should ordinary people care about such things? Isn't the means of production just something that one reads about between bong hits in the dorm rooms at university? Or is it perhaps something that is the domain of accountants and corporate managers, concerned with the proper techniques of double-entry bookkeeping? What is its great significance?

For those who are not sure, or don't care, The Road by Cormac McCarthy gives us a chilling glimpse of a society without capital or moral order — a world without a "means of production." It is a terrifying vision, and a wake-up call to those who regard questions of capital accumulation as being merely the dry and technical subject matter of economists. The novel is set in a postapocalyptic world devastated by a catastrophe of some kind that has destroyed the natural environment. It tells the story of a man and his young son trying to survive the dangers of the new world and retain their sense of goodness in the face of its horrors.

The country was looted, ransacked, ravaged. Rifled of every crumb. The nights were blinding cold and casket black and the long reach of the morning had a terrible silence to it.… He walked out in the gray light and stood and he saw for a brief moment the absolute truth of the world. The cold relentless circling of the intestate earth. Darkness implacable.… Borrowed time and borrowed world and borrowed eyes with which to sorrow it. (pp. 129–130)

The world of the novel is cold and inhospitable, and hunger is ubiquitous. Its natural capital has been devastated, and other capital goods lie useless in the abandoned homes of the dead. Aside from some surviving humans (and the occasional animal), plant and animal life on the planet has become extinct, and the environment is barren and cold. There is no way to grow crops or create food, and so humans revert to foraging through the stored goods of the old world, and preying on the only remaining source of meat — other people.

By then all stores of food had given out and murder was everywhere upon the land. The world soon to be largely populated by men who would eat your children in front of your eyes and the cities themselves held by cores of blackened looters. (p. 181)

1. Civilization, Capital, and Moral Order

Where do our stores of food come from? And where our civilization? Though modern civilization is a complex thing, it is also very simple in its essence, for it is built on three forms of capital that form the pillars of any civilized order. One of these is the natural and man-made physical capital that humans use to live and to sustain their production of goods — the "means of production" (and perhaps also the means of distribution of goods). In addition to this physical capital are two corresponding forms of human capital: the technical knowledge to operate physical capital and sustain production, and the moral order required to sustain organized use of scarce resources. The degree of civilized life that presently exists does so because we have inherited physical capital and technological knowledge, but also because we have some sense of a moral order needed to sustain these things.

The story of civilization is the story of capital accumulation. This has included an accumulation of physical capital, but also a corresponding accumulation of technical and moral knowledge. We are civilized only to the extent that we ask ourselves what kind of moral order is needed to sustain the accumulation of capital. What kind of moral order sustains a means of production?

There was yet a lingering odor of cows in the barn and he stood there thinking about cows and he realized they were extinct. Was that true? There could be a cow somewhere being fed and cared for. Could there? Fed what? Saved for what? (p. 120)

In the midst of a prosperous civilization, it is easy for people to become flippant about the moral order needed to sustain the accumulation of capital. Large stores of capital goods are already here, and it is the present concern of many people to worry about how these should be "distributed" to satisfy their managerial lust and quest for "social justice." In a situation of such abundance, moral relativism and nihilism thrive. All is subjective, and the good is whatever "the representatives of the people" determine it to be. Those who pooh-pooh the moral rules that sustain the accumulation of capital often imagine that they are acting on behalf of the weak and downtrodden. But the breakdown of capital is the breakdown of civilization, and this is of great harm to the weak and strong alike. Indeed, if there are any who are most dependent on civilized order, it is those who are the least likely to survive under the predations of the strong.

Oh papa, he said. He turned and looked again. What the boy had seen was a charred human infant headless and gutted and blackened on a spit. He bent and picked the boy up and started for the road with him, holding him close. I'm sorry, he whispered. I'm sorry. (p. 198, grammatical omissions in original)

The Road shows us the predatory nature of man in the absence of his means of production, and the degeneration of the moral order this loss entails. Though the man and his son struggle to remain "good guys" during their precarious existence, the world of the novel is mostly inhabited by "bad guys" — armed gangs who enslave unwary travelers and commit terrible atrocities.

They passed two hundred feet away, the ground shuddering lightly. Trampling. Behind them came wagons drawn by slaves in harness and piled with goods of war and after that the women, perhaps a dozen in number, some of them pregnant, and lastly a supplementary consort of catamites [boys kept as sex slaves] illclothed against the cold and fitted in dogcollars and yoked each to each. All passed on. They lay listening. (p. 92, grammatical omissions in original)

The man in the novel struggles to protect his little boy from the predations of other men, while at the same time struggling to maintain his sense of morality and bequeath good values to his son. He carries a gun for protection but has only two bullets, one of which he is saving to kill his own son if circumstance should require it. The boy is too young to comprehend the atrocities that will be inflicted on him if he is caught by "the bad guys," but the man is well aware. Though he devotes his life to the protection of his son, he also considers the fact that he will kill the boy as an act of mercy if they fall into enemy hands:

Can you do it? When the time comes? When the time comes there will be no time. Now is the time. Curse God and die. What if [the gun] doesnt fire? It has to fire. What if it doesnt fire? Could you crush that beloved skull with a rock? Is there a being within you of which you know nothing? Can there be? (p. 114, grammatical omissions in original)

2. Why Aren't We Eating Each Other Right Now?

Reflecting on the likely effects of massive capital destruction is a fascinating thought experiment. It is one that gives valuable insights into the nature of humanity and the fragility of our present civilization. It matters not whether the destruction is brought about by a sudden disaster, as in the book, or a slow feasting on the accumulated capital of the past. If the means of production are destroyed, or simply not sustained, then we are heading down the road to hunger and predation, as illustrated in the novel.

What stops us from eating each other right now? How long would it take people in our civilization to turn to gross acts of predation in the event of a catastrophic disaster? How long before we would see people start farming other humans?

There are essentially two reinforcing reasons that prevent present humans from treating each other in such a patently predatory way. One reason is moral: there is widespread acceptance that it is evil to enslave and eat other people in our present circumstances. The other reason is contextual: the accumulated capital of our civilization is sufficient to ensure that we simplydo not need to eat other people — we already have abundant food available to us. (One other alleged reason that might be mentioned is consequential: we fear the punishment that would be imposed on us for eating other people. However, this is a very minor concern in our present society and is not really operative on most people. The vast majority of people would avoid cannibalism under present circumstances regardless of whether or not they would be caught and punished for this behavior, simply because they do not want or need to engage in this kind of depravity. We mention this motivation only to explain that it is inoperative on most people.)

These two sources of civilized behavior — moral and contextual — are not independent of one another. Our moral views on slavery and cannibalism are formed within the context of a prosperous society where these activities are not needed to supply us with our needs (i.e., our present context affects our morality). Similarly, our lack of need for this source of food is itself a result of capital accumulation generated by having an ordered system of production built on moral rules (i.e., our moral system affects our activities, which affect our context). Though the first connection is widely appreciated, the second is not so well understood, and many people are prone to treat the fruits of civilization as just being here somehow (or as a result of science and technology, which got here somehow, etc.), without any particular moral principles needed to sustain them.

The fact that people's behavior is built on a moral foundation that is itself highly dependent on their context is a scary thought — even though people think it's abominable to eat each other right now, give them a few months living in a postapocalyptic moribund world and they might change their minds! Indeed, this is one of the main salutary lessons of The Road — it shows us the fragility of the moral principles that underlie civilized society.

3. Moral Order? What Moral Order?

Readers of The Road are likely to be struck by the strong connection between the lack of capital and the lack of moral order in the dying world. In that respect the book is an excellent instruction in the importance of capital to civilized life. But if all this is accepted, then what is the moral order required to accumulate and sustain capital?

To answer this, we must understand that capital is formed and sustained by productive efforts undertaken for future reward. By its very nature, capital accumulation requires a present refrain from consumption with a view toward expanding one's future productivity. In order for this trade-off to be worthwhile one must have property rights that function as the "boundaries of order" in our interaction with other people. This is what allows us to accumulate capital and avoid predation. It is what allows us to save for the future with the assurance that we will reap some reward, rather than having our efforts taken to feed looters and killers. The proper moral order for civilized life is one that allows cooperative action for mutual gains but eschews coercion. To the extent that this moral order has been practiced, it has allowed man to build capital and develop civilized life. To the extent that it has been violated, it has led to barriers to capital accumulation, or outright capital destruction.

Despite their peril, the man and boy in The Road are very respectful of the moral order of private-property rights.[1] They vow not to eat other people regardless of their hunger, and they show great respect for the abandoned property of others. When they stumble onto a cache of stored food in an abandoned bunker, the boy says a makeshift prayer for the people who left it there:

Dear people, thank you for all this food and stuff. We know that you saved it for yourself and if you were here we wouldn't eat it no matter how hungry we were and we're sorry that you didn't get to eat it … (pp. 149–155)

Though the story of The Road is a grim and uncompromising story of societal breakdown, it is also a love story between a man and his son, and a story of the struggles of good people in a bad world. The man in the story tells his son that they are "carrying the fire," meaning that they are carrying the remains of the civilized order of the old world. They are very much like those described as "the Remnant" by Albert Jay Nock in his classic essay: "those who by force of intellect are able to apprehend [the principles of civilization], and by force of character are able, at least measurably, to cleave to them."

4. Capital, Moral Order, and Human Survival

The vision of The Road is a vision of what occurs when man loses the accumulated capital of civilization and the moral order that sustains it. The book is vague on the nature of the disaster that lands its principle characters in the final days of their species, but this is not really important. What is important is that we are presently in the process of discarding the moral order that sustains the process of capital accumulation, and there is reckless disregard by many people for any connection between an objective moral order for cooperative conduct and the capital accumulation and maintenance they take for granted to feed their abundance.

Those who concern themselves with the "distribution" of the accumulated wealth of the world are a reckless force chipping away at the foundations of civilized order. That they do so with pretentions that they are working for the benefit of the weak and disenfranchised only serves to show their naïveté, and their disregard for the nature of man without his civilization. The problem with this decline is not merely a danger of loss of physical capital, but something far deeper and more total: it is a moral rot, gradually undermining people's capacity to produce and sustain production. Every coercive measure interfering with the moral order of private property and cooperative exchange is another chip at the means of production and the civilized life it engenders.

The Road shows us what it means to lose the means of production. It is not pretty, and it is not at all to the benefit of the weak, nor anyone else.

The book has been praised as a salutation to environmentalist philosophy because it shows the consequences that a total environmental breakdown would have for humanity. I cannot comment on whether the author intended the book to convey this view, though it does not seem evident to me that he did. (The disaster in the book is clearly a sudden catastrophe, and certainly not a gradual breakdown caused by the activities of man.) In any case, I take a different lesson from the book than the alleged environmentalist message. To me, the book conveys the strong connection between capital and moral order. By depicting its absence, the book shows us the core of a civilized society, and allows us to see the importance of capital in a far more commanding way than is presented by economists and their treatises.

At root, human beings are animals, and like other animals we have a hierarchy of needs to satisfy. Despite our ability to reason about our own conduct, our mode of behavior will always reflect the necessity of satisfying those needs in some way. In the midst of our present civilization, with all its abundance, the idea of enslaving and cannibalizing other people (including children and babies) is horrific and revolting, but it is a reality of human nature that this can come about under dire circumstances. What protects us from this result is the accumulated capital of the past, and our capacity to protect that capital by formulating an appropriate moral order to guide our actions. If we are reckless about the connection between our moral order and the accumulation of capital, then we are asking for disaster.

When a person glibly tells you that moral rules are just subjective judgments, or that they are something that transcends petty concerns over material goods, ask yourself where that position leads. If man adopts such a view on a wide scale, will he still exist in another thousand years? Or will his fate have been embodied inThe Road.

On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. Not be made right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were older than man and they hummed of mystery. (p. 287)

Comment on this article.

Ben O'Neill is a lecturer in statistics at the University of New South Wales (ADFA) in Canberra, Australia. He has formerly practiced as a lawyer and as a political adviser in Canberra. He is a Templeton Fellow at the Independent Institute, where he won first prize in the 2009 Sir John Templeton Fellowship essay contest. Send him mail. See Ben O'Neill's article archives.

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Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

Notes

[1] This discussion should not be taken to mean that the moral order of private property ought to be operative irrespective of context. The proper moral principles applying to human interaction may legitimately depend on context; see, e.g., Moral Rights and Political Freedoms (1995) by Tara Smith. It is quite possible that a moral order of private property would not be legitimate in a moribund world such as in the novel, and one might even make the case that cannibalism could be morally legitimate when humans are one of the few remaining sources of food possible. I take no position on these questions in this essay, but they are worth noting to avoid misunderstanding of the source of rights. What is important is that, in the context of a world where it is possible to sustain a means of production, a moral order based on private property and nonaggression is proper and desirable.

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Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

The Only International Economic Policy That a Country Needs: "Mind Your Own Business and Set a Good Example."

The Only International Economic Policy That a Country Needs: "Mind Your Own Business and Set a Good Example."

The international economic scene is dominated by state interventions at all levels. Daily we read of disputes over exchange-rate manipulation, protectionist tariffs followed by retaliatory tariffs, highly regulated free-trade blocs that erect trade barriers to nonbloc nations, bilateral trade agreements, and more. For instance, Great Britain is a member of the European Union (EU) but not of the European Monetary Union (EMU), meaning that it abides by all the regulations and pays all the assessments to remain a member of the EU in order to trade freely with the other members of the 27-country EU. But it does not use the common currency, the euro, which is used by only 17 of the EU members. British industry chafes at the many seemingly meaningless and bizarre regulations that raise the cost of British goods just so Britain can trade freely within the EU. Some regulations are so onerous that some British manufactures will be put out of business. The pro-EU faction in Britain, such as the leadership of the three main parties — the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats — recognizes the damage but proposes to lobby for special exemptions on a case-by-case basis. The anti-EU faction, led by the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), wants Britain out of the EU entirely, arguing that the cost of membership is too great and that the loss of sovereignty is unconstitutional. The same debate can be seen within every EU nation to some degree.

By now everyone is aware of the euro debt crisis — that is, that many members of the EMU are massively in debt. Lower borrowing costs and the ability of members to monetize their debts through the European Central Bank (ECB) by way of their captive national central banks created incentives that proved too powerful for governments to resist, so they embarked on profligate spending programs at the governmental level and enjoyed, briefly, a property boom that has come crashing down. Their way out of this mess is unclear. Some economists propose raising taxes and cutting programs, commonly called "austerity." Others have called for these countries to leave the EMU, reinstate their own national currencies, and devalue against the euro, supposedly to restore "competitiveness." Others have called for outright default on their euro-denominated debt.

The common assumption behind any discussion of these debates and crises is that a country cannot stand alone in the world and needs to negotiate trade and monetary terms with its trading partners, who may require the country to adopt measures that are antithetical to its interests. Is this really the case? Is it possible for a nation to free itself from all international agreements, manage its own currency as its sees fit, and trade robustly with the rest of the world?

No Country Can Harm Another Economically without That Country's Consent

In order to accept the wisdom of international noninterventionism in economic affairs, one must understand that no country (or bloc of countries, such as the EU) can harm another economically without that country's consent, meaning its tacit compliance. In other words, a country can adopt its own trading and currency policies and need not be influenced or harmed by the actions of any other country. But first of all, we need to understand the definition of "harm."

In his book No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market, Dr. T. Patrick Burke explains that harm consists only in physical harm or the threat of physical harm. It is not characterized by discrimination or a demand for special trading terms. The most common example of real, physical harm is war. War destroys the assets of others. Likewise, blockades cause real harm, because the blockaded nation is threatened by the destruction of its outgoing or incoming goods. Because it does not choose to fight to break the blockade or is powerless to do so does not mean that it is not harmed. However, a refusal of one country to allow its citizens to trade with another — for example, the EU's recent restriction on its members that prevents them from importing Iranian oil does not harm Iran. An internal example would be for a person to refuse to trade with a local merchant, due to some personal disagreement. That merchant is not harmed by the trade that he does not enjoy. Dr. Burke explains that the victim of discrimination is left in the same position as before the act of discrimination and that no nation or individual can claim to be entitled to the trade of another.

In fact the discriminating nation or person causes himself some extra cost and, therefore, harms only himself. Consider that an individual most likely must travel farther and pay more for goods or purchase inferior goods that he refuses to buy from his local merchant with whom he is feuding. At the nation-state level the European Union harms its own citizens, for they must pay more for oil, buy inferior oil, or suffer some kind of inconvenience. Otherwise, why would they have purchased Iranian oil in the first place? One could even go so far as to say that the EU wages war against its own citizens and not against Iran, for, undoubtedly, there are police sanctions that the EU would employ against its members for violating the Iranian trade prohibition that must rest on the threat of violence.

Regulatory and Monetary Interventions Harm Only Those Who Impose Them

I will continue to use the EU case as illustrative of my thesis that a nation cannot be harmed except by its own consent. The EU has adopted many onerous regulations on trade in goods and services with which its members must comply as a condition of EU membership. The EU has erected trade barriers for many goods and services against non-EU members. For example, the EU prohibits the importation of most agricultural products from Africa. Either there is an outright prohibition against importing African foodstuffs or the African nations cannot comply with complex and onerous regulations such as the prohibition against genetically engineered food. A country that wishes to trade with the EU either complies with EU demands or must find buyers elsewhere.

This practice does not fall into the Burkean definition of harm as regards Africa. It does, though, constitute harm to citizens of the EU. African countries are left in the same position as before: remember, no one and no nation has an entitlement to the trade of others. But we must assume that the EU prohibits African foodstuffs because its citizens would have purchased them in the absence of the prohibition; otherwise, the prohibition would not be necessary. Therefore, the EU regulations or prohibitions against the importation of African foodstuffs harm only EU citizens themselves. The African nations are perfectly free to pursue sales elsewhere in the world, although it is true that their standard of living would have been higher without the EU regulations and prohibitions.

The same is true of currency interventions. The United States has complained for some time that China intervenes in its own currency markets to hold down the value of the yuan in order to increase export sales. The US position wrongly claims that it is harmed because domestic companies lose sales to cheaper Chinese goods. But this is wrong. Viewed from the standpoint of justice, domestic companies do not have an entitlement to domestic sales. And viewed from a practical standpoint, America enjoys an outright subsidy from China. China sells the United States goods below cost and causes its own citizens to suffer higher prices; that is, higher Chinese domestic prices are caused by its currency intervention that gives American importers more yuan than the free-market rate, which is based on purchasing-power parity. As I explained in a previous essay, currency interventions to spur exports are paid by the exporting country's own citizens in the form of higher domestic prices. Should America foolishly prohibit the importation of Chinese goods, either by quotas or tariffs, it would cause harm only to its own citizens, who would be forced to pay higher prices, in addition to other economic dislocations.

Conclusion

The only international economic policy that a country needs is to mind its own business and set a good example to the rest of the world. A just economic policy for a free and prosperous nation would be based on the twin pillars of unilateral free trade and nonintervention into its own markets. This means a complete elimination of domestic regulations that attempt to set quality and safety standards (for the market will do that by itself) and complete abdication of manufacture and management of money.

It does not need to join a trade bloc or negotiate trade terms with other nations. If a trade bloc such as the EU sets import standards different from one's own domestic standards, each exporting company can decide for itself if the rewards for meeting the importing bloc's standards warrant the extra cost. It is not an issue for the exporting nation's government to decide. Furthermore, the exporting nation does not have to concern itself about importing from a country or bloc of countries that refuses to accept the exporting nation's goods in return. After purchasing goods from the protectionist nation or bloc of nations, that nation's currency will find its way back into its economy in the form of export demand from some other nation that accepted the currency in payment for some other good or service or it will receive a capital investment. If the currency never finds its way back to the nation that adopted unilateral free trade and is held indefinitely in the coffers of some foreign bank or central bank, that nation has simply been on the receiving end of a gift. An analogy would be that of a friend or neighbor who sells you something and then never cashes your check.

Prosperous nations have always been great trading nations, for they benefit from the expansion of specialization to a wider and wider extent. Robust trade depends on freedom to trade with the world under mutually agreeable terms of those participating in the trade, not on governments. All trade, especially international trade, depends on an internationally accepted medium of exchange. The most accepted mediums of exchange throughout the world are gold and silver. This acceptance is not based on government coercion but on market acceptance. Those wise statesmen who wish to see their nations prosper will adopt unilateral free trade, laissez-faire capitalism, and sound money. International cooperation among governments is not required; the market (meaning the people) will do the rest.

Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile