MUESEO NACIONAL DE MUJERES EN LOS EEUU

THE WOMEN'S MUSEUM®

			Italian Women Artists from Renaissance to Baroque March 16 - July 15, 2007 In celebration of its 20th year, NMWA will host this ground breaking exhibition.    » read more
			The National Museum of Women in the Arts at 20: Selections from the Archives Gleaned from the museum's archives and from the permanent collection, this exhibition documents the museum's achievements over the past twenty years.    » read more
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	Family Festival: Renaissance Revelry! Explore the art and culture of a royal court in Renaissance Italy at our annual family festival.    » read more
	Like Father, Like Daughter Series: Asia Argento & Isabella Rossellini This screening features Asia Argento's autobiographical film-within-a-film, Scarlet Diva and Isabella Rossellini's story of her father, My Dad Is 100 Years Old.    » read more
	Like Father, Like Daughter Series: Asia Argento & Sofia Coppola Program features The Heart Is Deceitful Above All Things from actor/director Asia Argento and Lick the Star from Sofia Coppola.    » read more
	Deadline for submissions NMWA's 20th Anniversary Festival of Film & Media Arts NMWA is launching our first film festival to highlight exceptional and exciting new film and media work by women. Submission Deadline: June 8.    » read more
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FROM LEGAL BLOG WARCH

Legal Blog Watch

Are Companies Really Firing Law Firms? Law.com affiliate blogger Rees Morrison takes up the question Are In-House Counsel Really Dumping Law Firms Abruptly? (Legal Times, 3/27/07). His response: It's hard to tell. Morrison says that there are many reasons that companies part ways with counsel. Sometimes law firms and law departments grow apart, key partners develop different practices or in-house counsel take over the work. Of course, sometimes firms are fired for blunders, such as high cost, poor communication and incompetence. In one instance, a company stopped using a firm that would not complete a company's diversity survey. The trouble with surveys that report on law firm firings is that "they have done a lousy job obtaining reliable numbers and percentages. " They don't show if a company actually fired a firm, or just thought about doing it. And surveys don't show if it's smaller firms that were let go, either because their billings were small or they were just brought in for a single transaction. Morrison concludes: It's no surprise that law departments decide, based on a single dramatic mistake or a series of avoidable missteps, to fire a firm. But despite the gaggle of surveys that have pronounced on this subject, the number of firms that a given law department fires each year is probably a small fraction of all of its law firm relationships. We need better surveys and clearer thinking for us to understand the actual incidence of abrupt terminations of law firms and the performance- or capability-related causes of those firings. In my view, whether the surveys are right or wrong is irrelevant. The fact that companies do fire firms, even if it's a far smaller percentage than reported, or think about doing so shows that there's still dissatisfaction with how firms are performing. If I were a partner at a large firm, I wouldn't be spending my time analyzing these surveys; I'd be surveying my own clients and finding out what I could do to better serve them. Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 29, 2007 at 03:29 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) RIAA Faces Some Pushback For a while, it seemed that the RIAA's strategy of suing large numbers of people who'd allegedly downloaded music illegally was working. Rather than spend money to fight the suits, many found it more financially favorable to settle. But this week, RIAA has received some resistance in two matters. In one, it eventually decided to back down. First, Al Nye the Lawyer Guy reports here that the University of Maine has told the RIAA to "take a hike" in response to the group's demand that the school turn over names of students who allegedly downloaded copyrighted materials.  And this post at Legal Pad tips us off to a powerful letter that a Visalia, Calif., solo "slung against the record-industry goliath," causing it to back down. The post includes choice excerpts from the letter, such as: Your clients take the position that my middle-aged, conservative clients should speculate regarding the identity of persons your clients claim used their AOL account to download pornographic-lyric gangsta rap tracks as predicate to possible case resolution. In an age of Wintel-virus created bot-farms, spoofs, and easily cracked WEP encrypted wireless home networks (among other easy hacks), the only tech-savvy response to such a request is, ‘You've got to be kidding.’” After receiving the letter, RIAA dismissed the lawsuit, though there's no word on whether the client will continue to pursue the attorneys' fees sought from RIAA in the letter. Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 29, 2007 at 03:27 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) What a Difference a Day Makes... We all know the saying "what a difference a day makes." As Eugene Volokh describes in this post, a day made a huge difference for a defendant convicted of statutory rape because the court adopted the statutory rule for computing the victim's birthday (i.e., the actual day) instead of the common law rule, i.e., the day before the actual birthday. In the case Volokh describes, a defendant engaged in nonconsensual sex with a victim the day before her 16th birthday. Under the common law rule, the victim would have been deemed to have turned 16 that day, thus enabling the defendant to defeat the statutory rape charges. Instead, the court held that Pennsylvania law, which provides that a person does not turn 16 until her birthday, would apply, which meant that the victim was under age on the date of the assault, thereby making him guilty of statutory sexual assault. Volokh doesn't dispute the conclusion, per se, but rather the rhetoric that accompanies it. He writes: But I don't quite see how all this rhetoric about "pervert[ing] justice," "maximum protection to children 16 and under," and "the greatest attainment of protection of society against child sexual predators" fits with the case in which the debate is about one day. Hooks would have not been punished under the indecent-assault-under-16 law if the incident had happened one day later; everyone agrees with that. The law would not have treated the 16-year-old as being in need of protection against consensual sex (nonconsensual sex is a different matter, but he was charged on that separately, and partly convicted and partly acquitted). How would there be any material loss of "protection of society against child sexual predators" if the court interpreted the law as allowing the 16-year-old-minus-1-day as being capable of consenting just as the 16-year-old is capable? Where would be the "perversion of justice" in such a holding? One could argue that there may be perversion of justice in changing a rule to a defendant's detriment, when the defendant could have reasonably relied on it (highly unlikely here, but possible in my hypothetical about the lovers who let out their sexual frustrations in doing legal research about when they can lawfully have sex). But -- again focusing on the statutory rape charge at the heart of the case, and not on the charges that required a showing of lack of consent -- it's hard to see perversion of justice in sticking with an old rule that would set the age of consent one day earlier than the majority thinks reasonable. Mike Cernovich of Crime and Federalism also comments on the case. From Cernovich's perspective, the defendant was essentially convicted on a technicality. He writes: This principle is illustrated nicely in a case from Pennsylvania. A man was convicted of statutory rape for having consensual sex with someone who, in just a few hours, was legally able to consent to sex. Convicted on a technicality. I certainly support statutory rape laws. Children should not have their youths misspent by adults. But convicting someone for conduct that, in just a few hours would be legal, is silly and unjust. Yet the court nonetheless affirms the conviction. As for me, I continue to marvel at the unusual facts underlying this case. What are the chances of a defendant assaulting someone the day before she turns 16 (is it 1/365, all other things being equal)? Can you think of any other lawsuits that involves unusual or coincidental facts that you wouldn't otherwise expect? Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 29, 2007 at 03:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) Should the Florida Bar Regulate Taste? Chuck Newton, of Spare Room Tycoon, posts on the Florida Bar's latest effort to regulate taste by prohibiting divorce attorney Steve Miller from running a straight talking ad urging clients to contact his firm if they need help "getting rid of the vermin [you] call a spouse. Here's where Newton comes out on the issue: The point of the matter for me is this. I do not like the spot. (I do not like it Sam I Am, I do not like when lawyers that act like hams). But, I do not like Judge Judy, Murry, or Jerry Springer (when it was on). I flip around the channels at lunch, and if I see one more trashy girl going ballistic over which one of the many men who might be the father of her child, awaiting the paternity test, (and, I am not just talking about Anna Nicole Smith), I think I might just off myself. It is not what motivates me. But it does to some people. Some people, like me, are turned off by this type of TV spot. Some people gravitate toward the hyperbole. Further, some people desperately need the services, at the price, this lawyer is offering. Nobody has demonstrated he is doing a bad job for his clients. Nobody is accusing him of not doing what he says he will do. No client is filing a grievance asking him to stop the ad. Only the Bar-tenders are not happy. I also posted about Miller here, at my home site, MyShingle. I agree with Newton; I can't discern any consumer-protection reason for the bar's ban. Moreover, to the extent that the Florida Bar believes that consumers may be mislead by the ad, it can fight back YouTube, the same tool used to post Miller's site online. But the bar doesn't have to prohibit the ads entirely. Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 29, 2007 at 03:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

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FRON LEGAL BLOG WATCH

Legal Blog Watch

Can Justice Department Official Monica Goodling Take the Fifth? Monica Goodling, a Justice Department official, invoked the Fifth Amendment when called to testify under oath before a Senate panel investigating the December 2006 purge of eight U.S. Attorneys. But bloggers aren't remaining silent about Goodling's decision. As this account from the New York Times (3/26/07) reports: Monica Goodling, the Justice Department’s White House liaison, who helped coordinate the dismissals, asserted her Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination in a letter that her lawyer sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee. In the letter, Ms. Goodling’s lawyer, John M. Dowd, questioned the fairness of the panel and cited the possibility that she might be a witness in a criminal inquiry, although there is currently no known criminal investigation into the dismissals. Some bloggers either don't buy or understand Goodling's approach. At Above the Law, David Lat asks: We're going to play unfrozen caveman legal commentator, and ask: Based on what we currently know about the U.S. Attorney firings, how could Goodling's testimony expose her to criminal liability, to place her in a position to invoke the Fifth Amendment? What are we missing here? Orin Kerr says this: I'm not sure I follow the rationale here. The Fifth Amendment privilege is available if the witness has reasonable ground to believe that her testimony will be used against her to prove an element of a crime. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896). What crime might Goodling have committed? I'm also puzzled by the comparison to the Libby case. Libby was prosecuted and convicted because he lied under oath, not because he admitted to criminal activity. Is Goodling taking the Fifth because if she testifies under oath she would lie and face perjury charges rather than tell the truth? If so, that's not a valid basis for the privilege. See, e.g,, United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). Or perhaps she is taking the Fifth because she lied before, and her testifying truthfully this time will reveal her earlier lies? UPDATE: According to the first page of the letter Goodling's counsel sent to the Senate, the rationale for taking the Fifth seems to be that Congress isn't being very open-minded and Democrats don't trust the Bush Administration. That's a new one; I don't think I've ever come across that one before. (Maybe there is more on the other pages of the letter not yet available?)   ANOTHER UPDATE: A few courts have discussed the theoretical possibility that there is some kind of "perjury trap" defense that might apply when a witness is hauled before a tribunal just to see if the witness can be tricked into comitting perjury. Courts have hinted that setting such a perjury trap might violate the Due Process clause. However, I don't think any court has ever actually found a perjury trap; courts invariably find a government interest that allows the testimony, and generally do not need to reach whether such a defense exists. See, e.g., Wheel v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1994). Perhaps that's what Goodling's lawyer has in mind?   YET ANOTHER UPDATE: The link to the letter now includes the entire letter, which in turn relies heavily on Ohio v Reiner. I don't see how Reiner is helpful. That case just says that a person can both claim that they are innocent of any offense and yet also claim the Fifth Amendment privilege. Well of course; a person can say whataver they want about their culpability without changing whether they have a privilege. But the Fifth Amendment issue is whether a person has substantial reason to fear that their truthful testimony will help lead to them being prosecuted. Goodling's letter doesn't give a legally valid reason for that fear, at least as far as I can tell. On the other hand, White Collar Crime blog reminds us: Now if this had taken place in a corporation that was under investigation, legal counsel for the corporation would be calling the parties in and asking the employees to answer questions. Either internal or external counsel would be investigating to determine if there was wrongdoing involved in the activities.  In all likelihood the individual would have no attorney-client privilege in a world where deferred prosecution agreements allow the corporation to act as mini-prosecutors and turn over evidence of the individuals to the government.  And if the individual refused to speak with counsel - the result would be - you're fired.  Will that happen here? And perhaps, more importantly, should that happen here?  What it is important to remember here is that we are all entitled to exercise constitutional rights, even those who work at the Department of Justice. By the way, if you're looking for a way to track the emerging developments regarding the U.S. Attorney firings, check out the new blog, Gonzales Watch. Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 27, 2007 at 12:07 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) Supreme Court Considers Liability for Secondary Actors in Securities Fraud Investment banks and law firms that handle corporate transactions will be watching the Supreme Court closely next term as it addresses the question of whether "secondary actors" like law firms, which facilitate fraudulent transactions, can be sued for securities fraud. Yesterday, the Supreme Court announced that it accepted review of Stoneridge Investment v. Scientific Atlanta, an 8th Circuit decision where the court held that civil liability for damages does not lie against defendants who merely "aid and abet" securities fraud unless those defendants actually made a mistatement. The 8th Circuit decision conflicts with the 9th Circuit's decision in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., et al., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), which held that secondary actor can be held liable if some if its conduct had "the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact" in support of a scheme to defraud."  (For a good overview of these issues, see this article, Expanded Liability Under Section 10[b]). What's interesting, however, is that what may have finally nudged the Supreme Court to accept review of Stoneridge isn't the split between the 8th and 9th Circuits alone but, rather, a recently issued 5th Circuit decision in an Enron-related case. As Lyle Denniston discussed in this analysis at SCOTUSBlog, the 5th Circuit threw out a class action against various banks and brokerage firms for transactions related to Enron's defrauding of investors, finding that "the banks and brokerage firms had not engaged in a "deceptive act" under securities fraud law. From Denniston's post: The Fifth Circuit said that the "banks [and brokerage firms) owed no duty to the [investors] other than the general duty not to engage in fraudulent schemes or acts (that is, the duty not to break the law)." Thus, it concluded, investors could not have relied upon the banks and brokers' failure to disclose publicly the nature of the Enron scheme in which they allegedly took part...Making third parties liable in the circumstance in this case, the Circuit Court said, "gives rise to confusion about the extent of secondary actors' obligations and invites vague and conflicting standards of proof in divers courts." Denniston's post, which was written before the Supreme Court's cert grant in Stoneridge, suggested that the 5th Circuit's decision, which aligned with the 8th Circuit, may have minimized the conflict, particularly because the 9th Circuit decision had become moot. But Denniston also noted that the Enron case was headed for the Supreme Court, and because of that, the Court might decide to accept review of a case that addresses similar issues already pending review. And apparently, Denniston was right. Posted by Carolyn Elefant on March 27, 2007 at 12:04 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

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Telefomo: 5839786
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